Publication by Kanta MATSUURA

K. Matsuura and H. Imai. ``Protection of Authenticated Key-Agreement Protocol against a Denial-of-Service Attack''. Proceedings of 1998 International Symposium on Information Theory and Its Applications (ISITA'98), pp. 466-470, Oct. 1998. (Full text (gzipped PS)): (Abstract) Authenticated and secure key-agreement protocols without a trusted key-distribution center usually owe a lot to public-key primitives whose implementation includes modular exponentiation. Since modular exponentiation is computationally expensive, protocols should be carefully designed so that attackers will not be motivated to use Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Considering this design direction, this paper first shows a basic protection strategy against DoS attacks based on public-key related computational cost. We then propose a three-pass authenticated Diffie-Hellman key-agreement protocol conforming to the strategy; DoS attacks impose expensive computation on the attackers themselves.; (Keywords) denial-of-service attack; modular exponentiation; Diffie-Hellman key-agreement; authentication; extra hash.